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Should the law treat adults and children the same? Gideon Yaffe thinks not; he thinks it is obvious that “kids” should be “given a break” in various ways, including lenient punishments or procedures that are “easier on defendants” (pp. 1-2). His aim in The Age of Culpability is to argue for why we should give kids a break: although their moral reasons may be the same as ours, they have less of a say over the law; thus their legal reasons are weaker, and thus they are less culpable for crimes and deserve a lesser punishment. 
The first stage of Yaffe’s approach is to argue against competing explanations of why kids should be given a break. In Chapters 1 and 2, he explores the idea that kids are reduced in culpability because of kids’ distinctive features. He distinguishes several arguments for this and points out that we often shift between these arguments. His discussion of these arguments, and the distinctions he draws, is lucid and insightful. I want to focus a little on one particular argument that reveals an issue with his approach.
“Proxy for Culpability” says that kids lack features “that are necessary for full responsibility for wrongful behaviour” (p. 21). Yaffe notes that Proxy is clearly contingent, with some kids having the features that are necessary for full responsibility; for instance, some kids will be just as rational and self-controlled as adults. Yaffe thinks that if there were a policy that better fitted the empirical facts about culpability—such as a policy that recognised that girls mature faster than boys and thus gave girls under-16 a break and boys under-18 a break (p. 31)—proponents of Proxy would have to view this policy as preferable. But Yaffe holds that our rationale for giving kids a break is “not sensitive” to these empirical considerations (p. 33). Thus, Proxy fails to “identify the fundamental rationale for giving kids a break” (p. 26).
The problem is that those who accept that kids generally deserve a break, without holding that all kids must be given a break, might not agree. They might hold that in fact our rationale for giving kids a break does depend upon, say, empirical facts about culpability such that more mature kids might deserve to be punished more. Yaffe thinks that “there is something deeply wrong with a system that allow for the possibility that some kids will be given no breaks” (p. 19). But Yaffe never really tries to show us what is so morally problematic about not giving some kids a break. 
Yaffe spends chapters 3-5 establishing his picture of culpability, desert, and legal reasons, which all feeds into this argument. These chapters are dense and detailed, so I will just sketch the features that directly feed into his main argument. Chapter 3 tells us that to be culpable for wrongdoing is to fail to properly recognise, weigh, and respond to reasons (p. 73). Also, to be diminished in certain ways—importantly, including as a citizen (p. 83)—can serve as at least a partial excuse. 
Chapter 4 turns to desert, and Yaffe establishes an interesting picture: a harm is a more deserved punishment for a wrongful act to the extent that the act and the harm combined have the “very same reason-giving properties” for the wrongdoer that the act alone has for a better agent (p. 103). This better agent is domain specific. In the domain of the criminal law we employ a principle of “Lenity”, so the relevant ideal agent is the worst possible agent who complies with the law (p. 108). If this ideal agent will not steal my apple because of certain reason-giving features, and I will steal the apple but won’t steal it if I will be fined $100, a $100 fine is a deserved punishment for me for stealing the apple. We can start to see Yaffe’s picture of why kids deserve a break: their legal reasons are weaker, so they require less weighty punishments to (counterfactually) get them to comply with their reasons, so they deserve weaker punishments. 
But are kids’ legal reasons weaker? Chapter 5 explores the weight of legal reasons. Yaffe introduces three useful ways of measuring the strength of a legal reason (p. 136): the “statutory”, concerning the punishment specified in statutes, the “expressive”, concerning community condemnation, and the “institutional”, concerning the power exercised by the state. These can interact in different ways: a statutory penalty may be harsh, but there may be little social condemnation and no state enforcement of that act. Yaffe’s discussion here is illuminating. 
What I find less persuasive is his picture of how the strength of legal reasons differs for individuals. Here is the problem. Yaffe’s suggestion is that “The strength of a given legal reason… can be… a function of the degree to which he has a say over the facts in virtue of which that reason has the strength it has” (p. 145). Yaffe endorses a “limited Republican theory of political authority” according to which the state has authority over a person because “that person has a say over the law” (p. 145). But Yaffe makes an important leap that I feel required more defence than he offered: it’s one thing to say that the state has authority over a person because that person has a say over the law, it’s quite another thing to say that the strength of the state’s authority over that person depends upon the degree to which that person had a say over the law. 
To argue for this, Yaffe appeals to an example: the members of a tiddlywinks club pay between $0 and $100; those who pay more have more say over club policy (p. 146). The club sets a rule that members must wear bow-ties to meetings. If a member does not wear a bow-tie, club officials can say that the rules have authority over him because he had a say over the rules (p. 147). Yaffe says that the member should reply that “the strength of the club reason to wear a bow tie was in part a function of his degree of say over club policy” and if he pays low dues his reason was actually very weak, the gravity of his offence is low (p. 147). But this illustration begs the question: to persuade us that the member’s response is legitimate, we need to first be persuaded that the strength of his reason does indeed depend upon his degree of say. The club officials might just tell him that his degree of say doesn’t matter—what matters is that he had a say. Such a response by the officials strikes me as perfectly reasonable. 
Yaffe does offer the idea that complicity matters. The greater our say, the more complicit we are in a judgment that something is wrong; further, criminal law involves public judgments of wrongness (p. 151-3). So perhaps our degree of say does matter, at least in the judgment that an act is wrong and criminal. There is also a very brief discussion (p. 164-5) of autonomy, our own reasons, and complicity: the more complicit I am in a judgment of wrongdoing, the more my own reasons play a role, and the more it is a reason for me not to perform that wrongful action. But these discussions were brief, and they did not go far enough to establish the central idea that the strength of our legal reasons depends upon the degree of say we have over the law.
Moving on, Chapter 6 explains how kids are diminished in citizenship. Kids have some say over the law, because they have free speech rights (albeit rights which can be limited by their parents [p. 170]), though they do not have a vote; this disenfranchisement means that they lack an important say over the law (p. 168). Thus, Yaffe’s account makes sense of why all kids, even precocious ones, deserve a break: because they are all disenfranchised (p. 183). In the rest of the book, Yaffe justifies why kids are disenfranchised, considers whether which visitors, immigrants, and felons deserve a break, and explores the various breaks that might be given, from more lenient punishments to procedural breaks. 
We can see the contours of Yaffe’s argument. Kids are diminished in citizenship, so their legal reasons are weaker and thus they deserve a break because to get a kid to comply with their (weaker) legal reasons requires a weaker prospective punishment. But, as I have tried to stress, this depends upon successfully arguing that the strength of our legal reasons depends upon the degree of say we have over the law. It is not clear to me that Yaffe establishes this. This is a dense book which raises important questions about a variety of issues concerning the law and moral philosophy. Much of it is fascinating and thought provoking, this book is well worth reading for anybody interested in culpability, both for children and in general.
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